Loving Big Brother: Comments on Seidman, Police Interrogation, and the Fifth Amendment by Burt, Robert A
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
Volume 2
Issue 1 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities Article 13
January 1990
Loving Big Brother: Comments on Seidman, Police
Interrogation, and the Fifth Amendment
Robert A. Burt
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh
Part of the History Commons, and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law & the Humanities by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert A. Burt, Loving Big Brother: Comments on Seidman, Police Interrogation, and the Fifth Amendment, 2 Yale J.L. & Human. (1990).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol2/iss1/13
Loving Big Brother: Comments on
Seidman, Police Interrogation, and the
Fifth Amendment
Robert A. Burt
Are we, as Professor Seidman concludes, "bound to remain irresolute"
in our understanding of the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimi-
nation because we are caught between two irreconcilable psychologies
about self-determination? I don't think so.
If these two psychologies-"autonomous" versus "situated and inter-
subjective" accounts of preference formation, as Seidman puts it-are
equally plausible, though mutually inconsistent, then we are inextricably
caught. If one account is more accurate but not widely understood as such,
then we are trapped in irresolution only if we fail to overcome ignorance.
Seidman does not clearly indicate his choice between these two explana-
tions for our current confusion. My choice is for the latter explana-
tion-that the account of "autonomous" choice made by socially isolated
actors is false. This account is, however, deeply rooted in conventional
theorizing. Though erroneous, it persists for the same reasons that the
"flat earth" theory seemed so attractive for so long: because it appears
continuously confirmed by daily experience of apparently indisputable
physical facts (my body and my mind are physically separated from
others', just as the earth seems flat when I walk on it) and because alter-
native explanations have apparently fearful consequences (if my choices
are not "mine" then I must be the slave of others who are making my
choices for me; if the world is round then I must surely fall off).
Seidman's failure to consign the conventional account of autonomous
choice to the discredited company of the "flat earth" theory has two un-
fortunate consequences: He misses opportunities to clarify the constitu-
tional jurisprudence about self-incrimination; and he falls into errors in
his own factual assertions about individual psychological functioning, er-
rors that compound the confusions he means to dispel in his
jurisprudence.
Seidman begins his analysis by distinguishing between "the truth of
statements concerning internal hopes, desires, and beliefs and the truth of
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statements concerning external facts about the world."' He correctly states
that this distinction makes sense only in the context of a "radically indi-
vidualistic" psychology, which is "controversial." ' Seidman seems, how-
ever, to embrace this psychology, or at least to treat it as no less plausible
than its competitor, when he discusses the truth status of coerced expres-
sions of remorse. He invokes three examples: public confessions displayed
in Stalin's "show trials," popular demand for an "apology" from Presi-
dent Reagan for the Iran-Contra imbroglio, and the common practice of
demanding that a convicted criminal express contrition as a condition for
sentencing leniency. In each instance, Seidman flatly states, there is no
plausible claim of sincerity, and therefore of truth, in the coercively ex-
tracted expression of remorse.'
Seidman's conclusion does follow logically from the "radically individu-
alistic" account of choicemaking. True remorse, from this perspective, can
come only when a person acts as a socially isolated integer-not because
others demand that he "feel" repentant and certainly not because he re-
pents in order to avert others' punishment. Seidman does not acknowl-
edge, however, that this consequence of the individualist account im-
peaches its psychological accuracy. The individualist account of the
preconditions for "true remorse" is inconsistent with the ordinary social
practice of apology.
Consider this commonplace example. I make some statement. You re-
spond, "That statement hurts me. Unless you apologize, I will no longer
have the same feelings of [esteem] [friendship] [love] for you that I had
until this moment." In this scenario, any apology from me is clearly
linked to a threatened adverse consequence. Does this "coercion" necessa-
rily impeach the truth value of any apology that I might offer? I am, of
course, "free" to withhold my repentance in the face of your threat; but
Stalin's prisoner is equally free to resist and suffer his torture. Are Sta-
lin's coercions clearly different in kind from the torments of the fabled
1. Seidman, Rubashov's Question: Self-Incrimination and the Problem of Coerced Preferences, 2
Yale J.L. & Humanities 149, 151 (1990).
2. Id..
3.
Stalin's objective was ...to force the defendants to acknowledge their own guilt and the
justice of their own executions. Of course, this objective could never be achieved. Stalin could
coerce the outward signs of agreement and submission, but no amount of force could achieve
actual consent.
Id. at 167.
It is quite mysterious why [the American public] should want such an apology [from President
Reagan], or, indeed, how a statement extracted under the threat of political reprisal can tell us
anything about whether the President was actually "sorry." Yet the public desire for such a
statement-meaningless as it inevitably would have been-was palpable.
Id. at 168.
IClriminal defense attorneys know that expressions of remorse can lead to a more lenient
sentence and therefore regularly urge their clients to make such statements. Of course, this
kind of implicit bargaining cannot produce actual remorse. . ..
Id. at 168-69 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 2: 181
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"prisoners of love"-from any of us, that is, who would be wounded to
the core of our self-esteem if our lover, our friend, our respected colleague
turned a cold face toward us?'
The individualist account Seidman appears to endorse would require
that both Stalin and my lover assure me that, while each would prefer
that I recant past offenses, the high regard which I previously enjoyed
from each would not be diminished in any degree by my refusal. The
individualist account would even insist that unless Stalin or my lover
freely and sincerely offered this assurance, without any fear of retaliatory
resentment from me, then no truthful exchange about our future feelings
toward one another could occur. All this follows from the individualist
account; and all this shows why that account is fantastically remote from
the experienced psychology of everyday life. This brief discussion of the
interactive and mutually "coercive" conventions governing apologies dem-
onstrates the workings of the interdependent network of social practice
through which each of us continuously defines and redefines our sense of
individual identity. This is the common sense of the psychological theory
regarding the social construction of self.' Properly understood, this theory
confounds the conventional disjunction between "freedom" and "slavery";
but though we are all mutually and equally enslaved by one another-and
4. Compare Hannah Arendt's depiction of the psychological force driving Stalin's victims toward
their confessions:
The disturbing factor in the success of totalitarianism is . . . the true selflessness of its adher-
ents: it may be understandable that a Nazi or Bolshevik will not be shaken in his conviction by
crimes against people who do not belong to the movement or are even hostile to it; but the
amazing fact is that neither is he likely to waver when the monster begins to devour its own
children and not even if he becomes a victim of persecution himself, if he is framed and con-
demned, if he is purged from the party and sent to a forced-labor or a concentration camp. On
the contrary, to the wonder of the whole civilized world, he may even be willing to help in his
own prosecution and frame his own death sentence if only his status as a member of the
movement is not touched. It would be naive to consider this stubbornness of conviction . . . a
simple expression of fervent idealism. Idealism . . . always springs from some individual deci-
sion and conviction and is subject to experience and argument. . . . [Tihe fanaticized members
[of totalitarian movements] can be reached by neither experience nor argument; identification
with the movement and total conformism seem to have destroyed the very capacity for experi-
ence, even if it be as extreme as torture or the fear of death.
H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 307-08 (1973 ed.).
5. Intuitive grasp of the application of this theory to romantic love and its relevance to police
interrogation practices is suggestively conveyed in the old standard, first popularized by Al Jolson:
You made me love you,
I didn't want to do it
I didn't want to do it,
You made me want you,
And all the time you knew it
I guess you always knew it,
You made me sigh for
I didn't want to tell you,
I didn't want to tell you
I want some love that's true,
Yes I do, Deed I do, You know I do.
J. McCarthy & J. Monaco, You Made Me Love You (I Didn't Want To Do It) (1913).
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thus also equally free-it is possible, and even likely, for some to disguise
this equality through brutal oppressions of others.'
Though Seidman acknowledges the psychological acuity of the interac-
tive theory, he is unwilling to endorse it because, he claims, it plunges us
into a swamp of normative indeterminacy. This objection emerges most
clearly in his treatment of Miranda.' Seidman says,
If preferences are not autonomous and temporally prior to interac-
tion, then there is no preexisting state of affairs that requires protec-
tion [against self-incrimination]. There is simply a choice between
different sorts of interactions that will produce different preferences.
An intersubjective approach thus fails to explain why we ought not
mandate-or at least permit-the type of interaction [between crimi-
nal suspect and police] that will produce a preference for socially
useful self-incrimination.'
This critique rests on a misunderstanding of the interactive account of
the construction of self-identity. There is a "preexisting state of affairs" in
this account that is "temporally prior to [the] interaction" between suspect
and police-the previous, extensive, and rich sets of social interactions be-
tween the suspect and his family, friends, community, and all of their
forebears. Seidman's truncated version of the interactive account treats in-
dividuals as inherently separated from their past networks of interactions.
He seems to view the interactive account through the socially isolating,
myopic lens of the theory of radical individualism, and he thus misses the
crucial factual premises of the interactive account.
To identify the "preexisting state of affairs" that the suspect carries
with him may not necessarily demonstrate that these past affiliations "re-
quire" or deserve protection in the interrogation room. The underlying
factual premises of the interactive account do, however, frame the norma-
tive question with greater clarity and precision than the competing prem-
ises of the individualist account. The interactive account clearly indicates
that the basic normative question at stake in police interrogation practice
is our social valuation of a citizen's past affiliations against the govern-
ment's capacity to separate the citizen from his past and thereby redefine
his civic identity in-and as-an exclusive, unmediated relationship be-
tween individual and state authority. The choice, thus portrayed, is be-
tween pluralist and authoritarian conceptions of social organization.
Seidman appears to claim that the individualist account not only frames
the question but dictates a normative preference for protecting the individ-
ual (with his preformed "private" preferences) against the incursions of
6. For elaboration of these observations, see R. Burt, Taking Care of Strangers: The Rule of Law
in Doctor-Patient Relations 92-123 (1979).
7. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965).
8. Seidman, supra note 1, at 174-75.
[Vol. 2: 181
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state or "extrinsic social" authority. The individualist account provides
this apparent resolving power, however, only by its insistent social myo-
pia-by seeing nothing more in the police interrogation room than an in-
dividual and the state. It is at least plausible (and even preferable for
understanding the real issues at stake in interrogation practice) to add
another individual, another "private" actor, to this confrontation-that is,
the crime victim. With the victim constructively present in the interroga-
tion room, the true conflict now appears: not between the state and the
criminal suspect, but between the suspect and the victim, each of whom
(according to the individualist account) has his or her own separate, so-
cially pre-formed but diametrically inconsistent preference regarding the
prospect of the suspect's confession and conviction. Insofar as a normative
consequence is supposed to follow from the individualist account, the state
is obliged to protect each of these private, autonomous preferences; but
since the preferences are directly contradictory, the individualist account
provides no basis for choosing between them. Some state action is of
course required to advance the victim's interest in the interrogation room
whereas inaction will protect the suspect, but the individualist account in
itself provides no reason to prefer state passivity. This account thus poses
but does not answer the question about the proper reach of state power,
about the relationship between state and pluralist sources of civic
authority.
The interactive account better frames this normative question because
of its superior psychological accuracy. The acknowledged experts in police
interrogation have implicitly testified to the superior accuracy of this ac-
count. The manuals used by police for their training in interrogation tech-
niques specify that the interrogator must establish a strong relationship
with the suspect. According to a widely used 1962 manual, the "principal
psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is pri-
vacy-being alone with the person under interrogation."9 Another popu-
lar textbook amplifies this proposition, specifying that interrogation
should "take place in the investigator's office or at least in a room of his
own choice" and not "within the walls of [the suspect's] home . ..
[where] his family and friends are nearby, their presence lending moral
support."1 These instructions make clear that it is not enough simply to
remove the suspect from his familiar surroundings. One might imagine
the police isolating the suspect in a room with nothing but pencil and
paper, and a sign on the wall, "confess or else." This emphatically is not
the kind of "privacy" enjoined by the manuals: the central tenet is that the
9. F. Inbau & J. Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions 1 (1962), quoted in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449 (1965) (emphasis in original).
10. C. O'Hara, Fundamentals of Criminal Investigation 99 (1956), quoted in Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 449-50 (1965).
Burt
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interrogator is "alone with the person under interrogation."'" This social
isolation is designed to produce a relationship between police and suspect
where "by the sheer weight of his personality . . . [the investigator can]
dominate his subject and overwhelm him with [an] inexorable will to ob-
tain the truth.'
2
What is the source of this domination? Viewed through the lens of the
individualist psychological account, the manual reference to the "weight of
[the interrogator's] personality" would appear to be a deceptive euphe-
mism for the weight of the interrogator's club, which he uses to provoke
fear of physical assault. If we use the lens of the interactive approach, the
prospect of physical assault assumes much less importance. By this ac-
count, we can take the threat of the "weight of . . . personality" at face
value.
The Supreme Court's endorsement in Miranda of uncounseled waiver
of the right to counsel necessarily depended on a view of the psychology of
the police-suspect interaction. I agree with Seidman that the uncounseled
waiver makes psychological sense only within the context of the individu-
alist account-specifically through the rationalist imagery (if not carica-
ture) conventionally drawn from that account, that an individual provided
with information (such as a criminal suspect who is warned of potential
adverse consequences by police) can readily choose a rationally self-inter-
ested course of action as long as he is given an opportunity to make an
initially "free and uncoerced" decision. 3 If this individualist account were
not available to the Court, if the only formulation for understanding the
psychology of the police-suspect encounter were the interactive account,
then the Court would have been forced to acknowledge that there is no
initial moment of disengaged "free and uncoerced" decision-making in the
encounter, that a complex relationship involving some degree of domina-
tion arises from the first instant of the police-suspect encounter.
This would follow from the interactive account not because of some
unique quality in the police-suspect encounter but because human beings,
by this account, are continuously and inextricably engaged in relationships
11. F. Inbau & J. Reid, supra note 9, at 1 (emphasis added).
12. C. O'Hara, supra note 10, at 112.
13.
At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be
informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. For those
unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of it-the thresh-
old requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise. . . . The warning of the right to
remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used
against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of
the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of
these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exer-
cise of the privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual more acutely
aware that lie is faced with a phase of the adversary system-that he is not in the presence of
persons acting solely in his interest.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-69 (1966).
[Vol. 2: 181
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(even when they are ruminating alone) and because the police (like others
who occupy authoritative social positions such as parents, teachers, doc-
tors, or lawyers) always convey some echo of dominance intertwined in
some degree with alluring promises of nurturance. By this account, the
intricate blend of dominance and nurturance in all of these relationships
stacks the deck toward "willing" (though often "resentful") submission by
suspects, children, students, patients, or clients.
This is the basis for the vulnerability to suggestion, the apparent eager-
ness to please, that provides the most plausible explanation for the docu-
mentation that Seidman cites regarding the undiminished willingness of
criminal suspects, acting contrary to any rationally detached conception of
self-interest, to waive counsel and to make inculpatory statements to police
in the post-Miranda era.' The socially isolated premises of the individu-
alist account obscure this vulnerability and its ubiquitous role in human
interactions.
Indeed, it is only a slight misstatement to say that the psychological
coercion available to the police in their encounters with suspects is the
force that underlies the ordinary practice of apologies: the threat that, if
you don't apologize, I won't love you any more. The police interrogation
manuals demand privacy between interrogator and suspect in order to
precipitate the feelings of dependency and the consequent "atmosphere of
domination"' 5 that gives powerful salience to this threat of withdrawn af-
fection. The team approach commended by the manuals-the " 'Mutt and
Jeff' act," alternating interrogation by ostensibly friendly and unfriendly
officers" 6-directly relies on this psychology by promising affection and
threatening its withdrawal. This is not police reliance on beatings; it is
more insidious and more effective than that. George Orwell had it right in
1984: it is possible to love, truly to love, Big Brother.
The interactive account of human psychology tells us this, and it also
offers a distinctive way of thinking about the role of attorneys in this so-
cial relationship. By the individualist account, the attorney's essential
function is to bolster the client's capacity to resist state authority through
providing information by which the client can decide what rights to claim
and what to cede, what to give Caesar and what to withhold. By the inter-
active account, the attorney is not so much an intermediary or barrier
14. Seidman, supra note 1, at 165-66 nn. 69-71.
15. C. O'Hara, supra note 10, at 112.
16.
"In this technique, two agents are employed. Mutt, the relentless investigator, who knows the
subject is guilty and is not going to waste any time. He's sent a dozen men away for this crime
and he's going to send the subject away for the full term. Jeff, on the other hand, is obviously
a kindhearted man. He has a family himself. He has a brother who was involved in a little
scrape like this. He disapproves of Mutt and his tactics and will arrange to get him off the case
if the subject will cooperate. He can't hold Mutt off for very long .. "
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 452 (quoting C. O'Hara, supra note 10, at 104; F. Inbau & J.
Reid, supra note 9, at 58-59).
Burt
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between Individual and State but more a source of authority, allegiance,
and love available to the individual as an alternative to the exclusive rela-
tionship demanded by the state. From this perspective, the right against
self-incrimination expresses a pluralist conception of social relations by
prohibiting state imposition of an exclusive relationship with individuals.
In the context of police interrogation, the attorney stands as the guarantor
of pluralism, as the proxy for others in the society-spouse, friends, par-
ents-who are prepared to stand by the suspect notwithstanding the de-
mands of state authority that he confess "or else. .. ."
If we view police interrogation through the individualist account, it is at
least plausible to conclude that the information necessary to apprise the
suspect of his rights can be conveyed adequately (even if not as effectively)
by state officials without the presence of an attorney for the suspect.
Viewed through the interactive perspective, there is no way that a state
official and an attorney can be considered interchangeable; each serves
contradictory psychological and normative functions.
The majority Justices in Miranda may not themselves have believed in
the psychological accuracy of the individualist account; they may have en-
dorsed the uncounseled waiver of counsel as a political move to mollify the
anti-crime lobby. Even so, the widespread currency and apparent accepta-
bility of the individualist account in our society, like the "flat earth" con-
victions of the unsophisticated in 1492, made it possible for Chief Justice
Warren to write this portion of the majority opinion without obvious em-
barrassment. I am, however, more inclined to believe that the Justices
embraced the individualist account with at least the same enthusiasm that
Professor Seidman displayed in his essay: that "although profoundly prob-
lematic," it is "attractive enough to [be considered] both plausible and
interesting."17 I further suspect that the Justices were misled by the ap-
parent attractions of this account in the same way that Seidman missed
the pervasive role of threatened loss of love in the social practice of apolo-
gies. If the Justices, that is, had understood the importance and effective-
ness of this threat in all social interactions, and its consequent relevance to
police interrogation, they could not have pretended to themselves or others
that an uncounseled waiver was at all responsive to the problem of psy-
chological coercion that they properly identified at the heart of the issue.
I thus disagree with Seidman: the individualist psychological account is
not "attractive"; it is malign. It is neither "plausible" nor "interesting"; it
is false. In this matter, as in others, we must see the truth to set ourselves
free.
17. Seidman, supra note 1, at 158 n.41.
[Vol. 2: 181
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